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The BRICS Taxonomy: Why Size Alone Is not Enough to Build a New World Order

Prof. Georgy Toloraya Former Russian Diplomat

By Georgy Toloraya

For nearly two decades, the quantative data on BRICS has been a source of comfort for those who believe the age of Western dominance is ending. This “arithmetic triumphalism” is based on seductive numbers: over 40 % of the world's population, a quarter of global GDP (PPP)”, the lion's share of commodity reserves. On any given spreadsheet, the bloc appears to be an economic colossus that should have already dictated the terms of global governance.

And yet, the reality on the ground tells a different story. The "collective West" continues to determine the rules, staff the multilateral institutions, and steer the global financial architecture with a confidence that seems almost oblivious to the rising weight of the so-called "global majority." The analogy is a multinational corporation: its production facilities, assembly shops, raw material producers, and transport departments—which today are overwhelmingly linked to the Global South—generate enormous financial results, but the "accounting department and design bureaus" are located - well, we know where. The West's continued dominance, in other words, is not primarily a function of economic weight but of institutional and decisional control. The "periphery" generates the wealth; the "centre" decides how it is allocated.

The uncomfortable truth is that we have been comparing the wrong metrics. In international relations, just as in biology, size is not always destiny. Distinguishing between species—whether an actor is a grazing herbivore or a predatory carnivore—matters far more than mere body mass. This is the analytical gap that plagues contemporary discourse on multipolarity: we count heads, tons of steel, numbers of tanks, but we fail to classify the nature of power that different states actually possess. This is more than an academic exercise. For BRICS to evolve from a diplomatic talk shop into a genuine engine of global rebalancing, its members must confront an uncomfortable truth: not all are created equal, not with similar national goals.

A proper taxonomy of state power begins with a fundamental question: who writes the rules? At the apex sit the "systemic architects"—the United States and China—the only states capable of developing the rules of the international system and compelling others to follow.

Below come the "global systemic balancers"—“sub-superpowers” - Russia today, and potentially India tomorrow—nations that lack the capacity to write rules but possess the heft to veto or redirect the architects' designs. Russia, despite its current constraints, fits this mould by virtue of its nuclear arsenal, permanent seat on the UN Security Council, and assertive foreign policy. New Delhi's current strategic trajectory—consciously navigating the divide between Washington and Beijing while refusing to subordinate its interests to either—demonstrates a clear ambition to graduate from a mere rule-taker to a credible balancer who can shape outcomes. India offers a crucial test case. Its greatest asset within BRICS is precisely its credible independence. Should New Delhi erode this position by leaning too heavily into anti-Western rancour, it risks losing the strategic ambiguity that elevates it to the "balancer" tier. Conversely, should it drift too close to the United States, its standing among its BRICS partners would fatally erode. The balancing act is narrow, but it is also the source of India's unique geopolitical premium.

Further down the taxonomy becomes politically delicate. The category of "great powers," traditionally occupied by countries like Britain, France, Germany, appears increasingly antiquated. These states possess immense institutional clout, advanced economies, and cultural soft power, yet their military-foreign policies reveal a growing dependency that constrains their freedom of action. Japan, similarly, boasts staggering technological prowess but exists within a security framework that renders its foreign policy profoundly beholden to Washington.

The taxonomy becomes more granular—and more politically charged—as it descends the hierarchy. Let us introduce the category of "upper-middle" powers or "anchor states": countries like Brazil, Turkey, Indonesia, Poland, and even Israel, which possess the capacity and will to conduct independent foreign policies within their regions or technological niches. They are the pillars upon which regional stability -or instability- rests, and they command enough respect or fear to prevent external powers from dictating local outcomes. Other middle powers, like South Korea, or Australia may be wealthier and more technologically advanced, yet they remain tethered to alliance.

The vast majority of nations, however, occupy the fluid lower rungs of this hierarchy. They possess inadequate economic foundations, unfavourable geography, or insufficient human capital to pursue independent lines. They are compelled to attach themselves to larger blocs, often subordinating their national interests to the dictates of external patrons. This is the unspoken reality behind the diplomatic rhetoric of "sovereign equality"—a fiction that serves the weak but is ruthlessly exploited by the strong.

This leads to the necessary debunking of the "Global South" and "global majority" mythologies. These terms, however appealing as rallying cries, are analytically bankrupt. They collapse vastly different actors—from resource-rich autocracies to service-driven democracies—into a single rhetorical category. They obscure the reality that Kazakhstan is not Brazil, that China's interests diverge sharply from those of African states, and that the Gulf monarchies harbour strategic calculations wholly distinct from those of Southeast Asian nations. The "Global South" is not a united front; it is a mosaic of competing ambitions, some of which are perfectly comfortable with the existing Western-led order.

What makes this taxonomy politically explosive is its explicit acknowledgement that within BRICS+—indeed, within the broader "Global South"—there exists a hierarchy of power and interest that cannot be wished away. Now the alignment of national interests in BRICS proceeds largely "by touch," based on each country's intuitive understanding of its own interests. This is a recipe for inefficiency and missed opportunities.

A more systematic understanding of each member's comparative power, its strategic ambitions, and its red lines would enable the bloc to identify genuine areas of synergy and avoid fruitless confrontations. When two members inevitably find themselves at odds—a scenario far from hypothetical—the bloc's instinct will be to appeal to peaceful resolution and international law. Yet, for the sake of the collective enterprise, decision-makers must quietly cynically assess which party is more strategically irreplaceable. This is the kind of realpolitik that multilateral forums typically avoid articulating, yet it is indispensable for strategic planning, as politics devoid of such calculus is mere sentimentality. Without understanding the hierarchy of interests and capabilities, the pursuit of a "synergistic" common agenda will remain elusive.

A new technological paradigm—particularly around artificial intelligence—is beginning to shift these calculations. The nations that control semiconductor production, proprietary algorithms, and the infrastructure of machine learning will define the parameters of this century. The question of whether BRICS can capture this technological wave, or whether it will simply replicate existing dependencies, will be decisive for the bloc's long-term trajectory. Here, the taxonomy offers a sobering perspective: technological leadership is not distributed equally, and the gap between the "systemic architects" and even the "upper-middle" powers may widen before it narrows. A country can boast abundant rare earth metals, but without the intellectual property to process them into cutting-edge microchips, it remains merely a supplier to the very powers it wishes to displace.

The struggle for a new world order is not a morality play between the virtuous Global South and a decadent West. It is a contest of power, interest, and institutional control—and like all such contests, it demands clear-eyed analysis of who can do what, who wants what, and who is willing to pay what price. Ultimately, the transition to a genuinely multipolar world will not be achieved by aggregate arithmetic. It demands a rigorous, unromantic assessment of who holds real power, who merely holds resources, and who is steering the technological ship. The history is written by those who understand that a lion is not defined by its weight alone, but by its claws and cunning. Until the bloc develops a clear-eyed taxonomy of its own members and its adversaries, it will remain a tower of numbers built on a foundation of sand.

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